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Abstract
This paper considers the problem of a decision maker who is faced with a dy-
namic decision problem with several alternatives, and additionally can engage in
prior consultation on one of the alternatives. Information received from others
is coarse. When consulting on an alternative that the decision maker is pre-
disposed to, she either consults someone that shares precisely her convictions,
or she consults someone who is more ”picky” than herself. Optimality depends
on the attractiveness of alternatives; when another alternative becomes suffi-
ciently attractive the decision maker prefers a picky contact. When the decision
maker consults on a lower ranked alternative, optimal consulting depends non-
monotonically on the value of the alternative she is pre-disposed to. For high and
low values of the pre-disposed alternative she prefers to consult someone with her
own convictions, but for medium values she prefers to consult a picky contact.
Finally a decision maker may prefer to consult on a lower ranked alternative.
JEL: C73, D83, D85
1 Introduction
Imagine having to choose between two different products, say A(jax) and B(otox),
whose characteristics are unknown to you. The products are such that the short-
term expected gain from each of the products are negative, but possibly, given
suitable experiences, are worthwhile in the longer-term vis-a-vis the product,
S(afe), you are currently using. Your initial assessment is that A is more likely to
generate long run joy than product B, so that if you had to choose between A and
B you would choose A. Suppose now that prior to making your choice you have
the opportunity to consult someone who has prior experience with one of the new
products (A or B). Whom should you consult? The answer to this question has
two dimensions. First, should you consult someone who has experience with the
product you already are pre-disposed to, or should you consult on the less likely
alternative? Second, given that you consult on an alternative should you consult
someone who likes the same characteristics of the product as you do, or someone
who likes different characteristics?
An important assumption for the main results of this paper is that the infor-
mation we receive from others is coarse. If consulting others perfectly reveals the
characteristics of the product then the recommender’s preferences over product
characteristics are immaterial, since his description of the characteristics reveals
to you how much pleasure you will get from the product. The paper therefore
fits in the literature on how decision makers deal with the particular problem
of information coarsening. Meyer (1991) shows how organizations that have to
deal with fundamental coarsening in communication in promotion decisions opti-
mally biases a sequential promotion contest to maximize informational content.
Calvert (1985) and Suen (2004) show that a decision maker faced with a binary
choice between two alternative finds it optimal to seek information from contacts
that are pre-disposed to the same alternative that the decision maker is already
pre-disposed to.
The paper contains three main results. First, suppose that the decision maker
must consult on the alternative she is predisposed to (say alternative A for con-
creteness). We show that unless the alternative B is relatively attractive com-
pared to alternative A, then the decision maker prefers to consult someone like
herself in the sense that she and the contact likes and dislikes the same product
characteristics. That is preferential attachment is given to contacts that are like
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the decision maker herself. When alternative B becomes sufficiently attractive,
in the sense that even ”good” news about product characteristics, relative to the
status-quo product S, is not enough to fully convince the decision maker about
option A, then she prefers to consult a biased contact. An optimal contact is
biased in a specific way. In particular she is more ”picky” than the decision
maker herself, in the sense that there are outcomes that the decision maker likes,
that the contact does not like, but not vice-versa. The intuition for why contacts
are biased in this specific way is that it allows the decision maker to distinguish
between the truly good news and the not so good news. This comes at a cost:
the decision maker may miss out on outcomes that improves on the status quo.
But this cost is outweighed by the potential benefits of trying out alternative B
on her own.
Second, suppose that the decision maker is restricted to consulting on alterna-
tive B, rather than alternative A that she is predisposed to. In this case whether
it is optimal to consult a biased contact depends on the value of the outside op-
tion (alternative A) in a non-monotonic way. In particular whenever alternative
A is either ex-ante relatively unattractive or very attractive then it is optimal
to consult a contact who likes the same outcomes as the decision maker. For
intermediate values of A it becomes optimal to consult a biased contact. The
intuition for the result is as follows. When A is of low value any good news from
alternative B is sufficient to convince the decision maker to stick with B. In this
case information on B has a first-order effect on payoffs, even entertaining the
possibility that the news on B is not so good. However as the value of alternative
A increases, by not distinguishing between the good and the not so good news
on B the decision maker bears a cost of trying arm B only to realize that the
generated outcome was worse than what she hoped for. Alternatively she may
choose to ignore the information for the moment and try out A, knowing that if
A turns out to be less than pleasing she can use the information on B in a future
period. In this case information on B has a second order effect on payoffs. If the
decision maker instead consults a contact with an optimal bias she can avoid this
(at the cost of missing out on the not so good news on B), in order to learn only
when B is truly attractive.
The third main result concern the choice of which alternative to consult on.
Should the decision maker consult on the alternative which she is pre-disposed to
or should she consult on the less attractive alternative? We show that a decision
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maker prefers to consult a contact that tries out alternative B provided that
alternative B is sufficiently ”risky”. That is the reason why the decision maker
prefers A over B is that B contains some very bad outcomes. By consulting on
B the decision maker can avoid experiencing such outcomes.
Many if not most decisions that we make in daily economic life involve an
element of learning. We learn what consumer goods we like by trying out new
products, what projects to invest in, which jobs we like, where we like to spend
our holidays, etc. Rarely is this learning based only on private experiences,
rather it typically takes place in the context of a social network where we observe
the experiences of and/or receive advice from friends, neighbors, colleagues, and
family members (Arndt 1967, Bandiera and Rasul 2006, Foster and Rosenzweig
1995). At least since the 1920’s sociologist have been studying the composition
of social networks (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). One of the most
robust key findings is that links in social networks, whether these are networks for
social support, friends or advice networks, tend to be organized by the ”homophily
principle”. This principle states that people who share similar attributes such as
race, education, age, line of work, etc. are relatively more likely to form links
with one another than they are to form links with people who are dis-similar1.
Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2007) construct a model where agents form multiple
friendships within a setting of distinct groups of agents. Agents value both similar
and dis-similar friends. Their model displays homophily2. The present paper
contributes to the literature on social networks, by providing a micro-foundation
for preferential attachment in networks. In particular the idea of this paper is
that we form relationships with other people for informational reasons, namely
for the advice they can potentially give us, or for the experiences they will expose
us to. By providing such a micro-foundation we are able to more precisely pin
down when preferential attachment are given to others who are similar to one-
self. It also provides novel insights into when preferential attachment is given to
people different from oneself, and we are able to say precisely what dissimilarities
attract.
1Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) introduced the term ”homophily” to describe this robust
phenomenon.
2In fact it displays a stronger form of homophily known as ”inbreeding homophily”
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001), which means that the equilibrium network dis-
plays more homophily than a network formed randomly where the probability of a link is
proportional to the size of the group.
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Perhaps the most straightforward application of our model is to consumer choice,
which we used to introduce the basic question of the paper and the main results.
Most products available in the market place are experience goods, and therefore
a consumer will try out goods in order to determine the attractiveness of its
characteristics. Talking to others or the mere observation that others have already
adopted a product may make it more or less likely that a given consumer tries out
the product as well, depending on the characteristics and tastes of the consumers
who have adopted the product. If some inference is possible about the tastes of
the adopter such information is valuable. Another application is to mentoring.
The mentor tutors her mentee by relating advice on choice of action in important
decisions, usually based on the lived experience of the mentor. A successful
mentorship requires that actions taken in the past are informative about what
sort of consequences actions taken today will likely lead to. The mentoring case
has a natural separation of time where first the mentor makes her decisions and
thereafter the mentee takes her decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a dy-
namic learning environment for a single decision maker, and presents some pre-
liminary results. In section 3 we introduce the full model which contains the
possibility of learning from contacts. Section 4 presents our main results. In
section 5 we relate the model and results to literature on this topic. Section 6
concludes.
2 Learning in Autarky
This section considers the simple problem of decision making in autarky. The
section is a building block towards the next section where we introduce learning
by observation on top of the individual decision problem analyzed here. We first
describe the decision problem and then characterize optimal strategies.
We model the decision problem as a bandit problem. Bandit problems have
been used previously in the economics literature to study both individual learning
(Rothschild 1974), and learning in groups (Bolton and Harris 1999, Cripps, Keller,
and Rady 2002). A bandit problem is an interactive decision problem. The
decision maker interacts with the environment (by taking an action), receives
payoff relevant feedback (an outcome) about the desirability of the action and
then interacts with the environment again.
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The specification of the bandit that we choose is the simplest such environ-
ment we can think of that allow us to capture the effects highlighted in the
introductory section. In particular, the decision horizon is two periods. Relative
to the ”standard” bandit problem the decision problem is simple since one period
of experimentation with an arm reveals all payoff relevant information about that
arm3.
The bandit problem studied in this paper has three independent arms4 A =
{a, b, s}. Each arm has a finite set of states, Θi, i = a, b, s. Nature chooses a
state for each arm i from the commonly known prior distribution pi : Θi → (0, 1],
where
∑
θ p
i(θ) = 1.
Time is discrete. At each time t = 1, 2 the decision maker (DM) must take
an action. If arm i is chosen at time t and the state of the arm is θ then the DM
receives the (deterministic) outcome xi(θ). In order to make the characterization
as simple as possible, we assume that arms a and b have three possible states,
whereas arm c has a single (known) state. Thus from an ex-ante perspective
arms a and b are risky, whereas arm c is safe. The set of possible outcomes X are
given by: X = {xa(1), xa(2), xa(3), xb(1), xb(2), xb(3), xs}. The outcome function
f : A×Θ→ X associates to each arm and state the outcome received.
The DM is Bayesian rational and has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function: u : X → R. We normalize the outcome on the safe arm, s, to 0. Except
where explicitly stated we also restrict attention to preferences over outcomes
such that ex-ante the expected per period payoff from actions a and b are strictly
negative, but there is at least one outcome that is preferred to the safe outcome
(Call this assumption [A1]). This underlines our initial assertion that a and b are
risky, but potentially attractive to the decision maker. These restrictions are not
essential and only serve to rule out trivial cases.
The objective of the decision maker is to maximize the expected sum of utility.
2.1 Optimal Strategies
In this section we characterize optimal strategies for decision makers in autarky.
We also present results on learning in autarky, which will be useful when char-
acterizing environments with social learning. None of the results presented in
3In technical terms conditional on the state of arm i the outcome distribution on arm i is
degenerate.
4We use the terms arms, actions and alternatives interchangeably.
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this section are new. However they show that the insights from more general
specifications of the decision problems carries over to this simpler setting.
The fundamental trade-off for the decision maker is that between exploration
and exploitation. By taking a risky action the decision maker faces a cost of
acquiring information today, but the information gathered can be used to exploit
the arm tomorrow. More generally the question is how much information to
gather before starting to exploit the information which has been gathered.
In order to solve for optimal strategies it is useful to define the time t history. A
time t = 1, 2 history lists actions taken and outcomes experienced up until time
t− 1. A terminal history is the history listing actions and outcomes experienced
up until and including t = 2. Optimal strategies can be solved for by backwards
induction. In particular at time t = 2 for any possible history an optimal strategy
involves playing the action that maximizes her myopic payoff. This follows since
t = 2 is the final period of play, hence at this point the decision maker should
exploit the information she has gathered. It then follows from our assumption
that acquiring information is costly, that a candidate for an optimal strategy
takes the following forms: (i) either play the safe action s in both periods, (ii)
play either a or b at t = 1 and play sequentially rational at t = 2. In case (i)
prior beliefs are such that the value of acquiring information is outweighed by
the costs. Case (ii) is the complementary case where in particular an exploration
phase is followed by an exploitation phase.
To see this in more detail, suppose that the DM played s at t = 1. Then the
expected payoff from taking actions a or b are strictly negative. Thus the optimal
action after history {xs} is to play s.
Now suppose the DM played risky action i = a, b at t = 1. At t = 2 playing
risky action −i is clearly suboptimal since the expected payoff is strictly negative.
Thus the optimal action at t = 2 is either action i again or the safe action s.
Given the preferences of the DM we let Θi+ be the list of states on arm i that
yield outcomes that are strictly preferred to the safe outcome, more formally:
Θi+ = {θ ∈ Θ| u (f(i, θ)) > u(xs)}
Following this convention we will let X i+ be the set of outcomes on arm i which
are preferred to the safe outcome.
The worth of the strategy in which the DM plays arm c, Wc, in both periods
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is 0. The worth of the strategy that starts by pulling risky arm i, i = a, b is:
Wi = E [u (f (i, θ)) |p] +
∑
θ∈Θi+
pi(θ)u(f(i, θ))
where the first term may be interpreted as the cost of exploration and the sec-
ond term as the benefit of exploitation. An optimal strategy is a strategy that
maximizes the worth among all possible candidate strategies.
We summarize our findings in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The candidate optimal strategies lead to the following behavior on the
path:
1. Play the safe action at t = 1 and t = 2.
2. Play risky action i at t = 1. At t = 2 play risky action i if x ∈ X i+ and s
otherwise.
For what follows it will be helpful to know whether learning in this setting is
complete in the sense that the DM eventually (with probability one) adopts the
action that would be optimal had she observed the state of the world. Let this
action (which depend on both the state and preferences) be denoted by α ∈ A.
Since the DM will experiment with at most one risky alternative, say r, when
using an optimal strategy, it follows that with positive probability r 6= α. There-
fore the DM will not learn the ex-post optimal action with probability one. This
result is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. With positive probability the DM does not learn the ex-post optimal
action.
The result can be stated in much more general settings, see e.g. Rothschild
(1974). The basic message, however, is the same: it is generally not in the DM’s
interest to learn the ex post optimal action with probability one. In the present
model a DM could, if she wished to do so, learn the ex-post optimal action with
probability one by experimenting with both risky alternatives. In our setting this
is not optimal, because the decision horizon ends after t = 2 (or equivalently
the DM uses a discount sequence (1, 1, 0, . . . )). Thus there would be no time to
exploit the information gathered.
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3 Learning from Others
This section contains the description of the main model. The following section
details our main results. We introduce a model where a DM can learn from ob-
serving the experiences of others prior to having to choose actions herself. Such
a setup is meant to capture a variety of examples, e.g. the recommendations in
consumer-to-consumer networks of experience goods; in this example the separa-
tion in the timing of decision between agents captures the information available to
early and late adopters. Formally, we augment the single person decision problem
considered in the last section with a prior observational stage.
3.1 Description of the Game
Suppose we augment the decision problem analyzed in the previous section in the
following way. There is a finite set of players, which consists of a set of players
called contacts, and a single player called the decision maker (DM). The set of
contacts is denoted C. Contacts may differ in their preferences over outcomes,
which are represented by a VNM-utility function. At the beginning of play a
state is drawn from the commonly known probability distribution p on Θ. Then
each contact solves in autarky a decision problem identical to the problem ana-
lyzed in the previous section. The player DM on the other hand can engage in
observational learning. In particular at the beginning of play she chooses which
contact in C to observe. Let the contact that DM observes be denoted cˆ. Whereas
the starting history of all contacts is the empty history and their time t history
is their private experiences up until time t− 1, the starting history of DM is the
terminal “history” of cˆ (exactly what we mean by “history” will depend on the
informational setting specified below). It is in this sense that DM engages in
observational learning by sharing the ”history” of cˆ.
We assume that DM has perfect information about the preferences of her
contacts. Technically, by observing a particular contact, DM chooses a particular
distribution of terminal histories as her starting history. In the terminology of
the experience good example, it may be that there are specific characteristics
about the product (e.g. the color of the product) which the consumer does not
care about, but she may care about other characteristics of the product (e.g. how
much electricity it consumes). Intuitively in this case if the consumer is restricted
to asking questions of the form: “Did you like this product or not?” then she
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will receive a different distribution of answers to the question depending on the
preferences of the person she asks.
We consider two informational settings. In the most informative setting both
the sequence of outcomes and actions experienced by the contact (cˆ) is observable
to DM. In the least informative setting only the sequence of actions taken by
cˆ is observable to DM. Let the informational setting where also outcomes are
observable be denoted by IO, and the setting where only actions are observable
be denoted IA.
Our main interest is a characterization of the equilibrium mapping (we will look
for sequential equilibria) between the preferences of DM and the preferences of
cˆ. As will become clearer below the behavior of a contact is independent of the
preferences of DM due to the exogenously imposed time separation. Therefore
in this paper the characterization will be a mapping from the set of preferences
of DM to the set of preferences of cˆ. In the example of consumer adoption of
an experience good, the characterization answers the question: Who would you
like to consult? Note that we require that DM chooses whom to consult at the
beginning of play, that is the characterization we are interested in is the optimal
ex-ante correspondence between the preference of DM and the preferences of cˆ.
The philosophy of the modeling is to pick the simplest learning environment that
allow us to display the effects we are interested in. Thus e.g. the choice of three
outcomes on a risky arm is necessary and sufficient to show that a decision maker
may prefer to pick a contact more ”picky” than herself. Likewise the choice of
two risky arms is precisely enough to fix the interesting trade-off that we identify
between learning about one alternative vs. another. Finally we have assumed
that learning is particularly easy, in that one period of experimentation perfectly
reveals all the outcome relevant information about an arm. The qualitative in-
sights that we develop should be robust to a relaxing of this assumption. We
comment more on this below.
An obvious reservation about the model, in the context of the consumer ex-
ample, is that people may consult more than one contact before deciding whether
or not to buy a particular product. However there is evidence that the majority
of consumers only relies on a small set of acquaintances before deciding whether
to adopt a specific product (Brown and Reingen 1987). This may be due to time
constraints, or it may be that unless the decision maker knows the preferences
9
of the other decision makers well, the informational content of such recommen-
dations may be low. From a modeling perspective the reason is simply that this
modeling choice allow us to focus more precisely on how the incentives to learn
from particular decision makers depend on preferences over outcomes. In partic-
ular by observing one contact rather than the other, entails an opportunity cots.
The decision maker will learn something but not all about the environment she
has been placed in.
The assumption that DM knows perfectly the preferences of all her contacts
is strong. The model applies to situations where decision makers know each
other well, such as long term relationships. From a modeling perspective the
assumption focuses the analysis on the value of diverse information.
4 Main Results
This section presents our main results. The analysis proceeds from the perspective
of DM, and asks the question: Which preferences would I like the recommender
to have? The answer naturally depends on the informational setting and the
preferences of contacts. First we shall answer the following question: Are there
informational settings and preferences of contacts such that with probability one
observing such a decision maker allows DM to infer her ex-post optimal action?
We show that this question has a positive answer, and we characterize the infor-
mational setting and the set of preferences that allow such inference. The most
interesting insight is that cˆ will be more “picky” than DM. In this set-up the
relation ”more picky than” refers to liking a fewer number of outcomes of an
action. Why is it good to observe someone who is picky? Suppose that only
actions can be observed, but not actual outcomes. Then an observer may value
precise information about when an action is attractive higher than the knowledge
that it is preferred to a safe choice. In this cardinal information may be more
valuable than ordinal information. This is the real distinction between first best
contacts and second best contacts. In the first best case contacts must be picky
so that they are willing to switch action. In the second best case pickiness is
good because it reduces the uncertainty about the value of the prize on an arm.
The up shot of pickiness is that the observer may miss outcomes that are also
preferred to the safe outcome.
Our primary interest is in situations where DM cannot learn the ex-post op-
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timal action with probability one. However also in this second best setting do we
find an informationally based intuition about “pickiness” identified in the first
best setting. In addition we identify decision problems such that a decision maker
prefers to learn from a contact willing to experiment with alternatives that appear
ex-ante non-attractive, rather than a risky alternative which is ex-ante relatively
more attractive.
4.1 First Best Observation
The purpose of this section is to characterize behavior of contacts and environ-
ments that allow the observer to infer her ex-post optimal action with probability
one. We show that if information transmission is precise, in the sense that out-
comes can be observed, then such contacts exists, provided [A1] does not hold.
Generally and unsurprisingly such contacts are characterized by a high willing-
ness to experiment. An important insight that we will re-discover when we turn
to second best observation is that the DM who is being observed will in general
be ”more picky than” the observer.
We will say that a pair (cFB, IFB) is first best if there exists a contact, cFB, and
an informational setting, IFB, such that DM can infer her ex-post optimal action
with probability one after having observed cFB in environment IFB.
As anticipated the existence of cFB relies heavily on the willingness of cFB
to experiment. In order to learn the ex-post optimal action with probability
one cFB must be willing to experiment with both alternatives a and b, even if
she finds herself in period 2 having experienced an unattractive outcome on one
of the risky arms in period 1. In other words the ex-ante expected per period
payoff must be strictly positive for both risky actions (Assumption [A1] rules
out preferences of this form). However a willingness to experiment with both
alternatives is not sufficient for first best observation. A second condition must
be satisfied. This condition relates to the order in which experimentation takes
place and the sensitivity of preferences to outcomes.
Some notation will be needed to state the result. Let u¯i = maxθ u(f(i, θ))
be the maximum period payoff on arm i = a, b, and let uˆi = minθ∈Θi+ u(f(i, θ)).
Without loss of generality assume that u¯a > u¯b > 0. Note that we may have
u¯i = uˆi in which case there is a unique outcome on i that is preferred to the safe
outcome.
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Proposition 1. Let the preferences of DM be represented by u. A pair (cˆ, I) is
first best if and only if:
1. Actions and Outcomes are observable (I = IO).
2. cˆ starts experimenting with arm a, and switches to arm b whenever u(f(a, θ)) <
u¯b.
Note that it follows from the proposition that a contact who is not willing
to experiment with both risky actions can not be first best independent of the
informational setting.
The result is easily generalized to any finite number of states and an arbitrary
number of risky alternatives. The result of complete learning from contacts is
special to our setting, and does not generalize. E.g. in the environment of
(Rothschild 1974) it is not true that if a firm was able to observe arbitrarily
many periods of experimentation by another firm then it would learn the ex-
post optimal action with probability one. We present the result here partly for
completeness but also because it provides important insights into the case of
second best learning from contacts.
Earlier we alluded to a decision maker being ”more picky than” another deci-
sion maker. We can now say more precisely what this means, and why it benefits
DM to observe a decision maker who is more picky than she is. First note that
the characterization imply that whenever cˆ likes an outcome5 on a then DM likes
it as well. And whenever DM dislikes an outcome on a then cˆ dislikes it as well.
To a large extent then their ordinal rankings on a relative to the safe outcome
are aligned. However it is necessary that they disagree about outcomes that DM
values positively but does not care about very passionately. Here their ordinal
rankings must be opposed, since this is precisely the point where DM has a posi-
tive valuation for information on arm b. To satisfy incentive compatibility it must
be that cˆ dislikes such outcomes. It is in this sense that cˆ is ”more picky than”
DM6.
5These statements are relative to the safe outcome.
6cˆ’s preferences over outcomes on arm b does not play a role as long they satisfy that ex-ante
the expected per period payoff of b i strictly positive. However if we were to add a third risky
arm (and extend the decision horizon) then a similar result of ”more picky than” on arm b
could be stated.
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4.2 Second Best Observation
The remainder of the paper focuses on the case where assumption [A1] is satisfied
for all decision makers. Under this assumption it follows from Proposition 1 that
there is no first best contact informational environment pair. Consequently we
will focus on the second best. This section considers the informational setting
where only actions are observable, i.e. IA. The characterization in environment
IO is trivial given the simple setup.
The analysis proceeds as follows. First we characterize second best observation
under the assumption that contacts only experiment with the risky alternative
that is ex-ante most attractive to DM. We show that in this case DM may prefer
to observe contacts that have preferences different from herself on the arm. We
then turn to the question of whom to observe when it is only possible to learn
about the risky alternative which is the least favored ex-ante among the two risky
alternatives. Here we re-discover that it may be optimal to learn from observing
picky contacts. Finally we turn to the question of which alternative to learn
about. The most interesting finding is that a DM may prefer to learn about a
risky alternative that she does not find attractive ex-ante.
To proceed some notation is needed. It is well known that optimal behavior in
bandit problems with independent arms can be characterized via Gittins Indices.
Consider the following simplified bandit with only two arms: a risky arm i and
a safe arm s. Suppose the DM starts by using arm i. At any time thereafter
she can switch to arm s (without being able to return to i). What is the period
expected discounted payoff if the DM optimally abandons arm i? This is the
value of the Gittins index of arm i. In particular the Gittins index of arm i is the
per period discounted value of the solution to an optimal stopping problem. In
our context the solution to the optimal stopping problem is particularly simple:
At time t = 2 arm i should be abandoned if and only if x /∈ X i+. We let Λi denote
the value of the Gittins index of arm i.
Once the Gittins index have been calculated the optimal strategies are simply:
in each period play the alternative with the largest Gittins index. At every time t
a DM then has a ranking over the alternatives available to her, which may evolve
as history accumulates. For our purposes here we will say that a risky arm i is
ex-ante preferred to risky arm j if Λi ≥ Λj.
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4.2.1 Learning about a Favored Alternative
Suppose we restrict the contacts in C to only contain contacts whose preferences
are such that they are willing to experiment with DM’s ex-ante preferred alterna-
tive, which wlog we will assume is alternative a. We place no further restrictions
on the preferences of contacts over outcomes on arm a.
The following dichotomy which identifies whether two decision makers have
the ”same” ordinal rankings over alternatives will be useful:
Definition 1 (Aligned). A pair of preference relations restricted to outcomes on
arm i (X i), and represented by utility functions, u, u′ : X i → R, are aligned on
i if either:
1. For all θ: u(f(i, θ)) > 0 if and only if u′(f(i, θ)) > 0, or
2. For all θ: u(f(i, θ)) > 0 if and only if u′(f(i, θ)) < 0.
If preferences are not aligned in the sense defined above then we shall say that
preferences are biased.
Our first result shows that if all that matters to DM is that she learns whether
or not she prefers the outcome on arm a to the safe outcome, then it is optimal
to observe a contact whose preferences are aligned with hers.
Proposition 2 (Aligned Contacts). Suppose that (i) actions are observable, and
(ii) contacts are willing to experiment with arm a only. DM finds it optimal to
observe a contact with aligned preferences when:
1. DM is not willing to provide experimentation with arm b (Λb < 0 = u(xs))
2. DM is willing to provide experimentation with arm b but any preferred out-
come on a discourages experimentation with b (0 ≤ Λb < 2uˆa1+P
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ)
).
The intuition is that if any outcome on a preferred to the safe is enough to
discourage experimentation on b then DM does not need to discriminate between
preferred outcomes; she only requires ordinal information to determine her opti-
mal action. The benefit of observing a biased contact is that she can discriminate
between preferred outcomes. In other words by observing a biased contact she can
get cardinal information. As we shall see in the next result when such cardinal
information is important then DM optimally observes a biased contact.
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The reader may have noticed that the same inference can be made from a
contact whose opinions are diametrically opposed to DM’s. While this is an in-
teresting insight, we consider it to be non-robust. In particular the insight is
not robust in decision problems where an additional risky arm is added and the
decision horizon extended suitably. In this case observing a contact with dia-
metrically opposed preferences is less useful, since such a contact will be staying
with the same action, precisely when the observer values additional information
on other alternatives. Thus the reader should emphasize likeness rather than
opposition in interpreting the result.
The next result shows that when DM may be willing to experiment with b
even after learning that a has a preferred outcome, then it is optimal to observe
a biased contact. The nature of the bias is also characterized.
Corollary 1 (Biased Contacts). Suppose (i) that actions are observable, (ii)
contacts are willing to experiment with arm a only. DM finds it optimal to observe
a biased contact when DM is willing to experiment with b and is not discouraged
from experimentation with b by learning that a has a preferred outcome (Λb ≥
2uˆa
1+
P
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ)
). Moreover, the contact is biased on DM’s lower ranked outcome
(uˆa).
In the present context when a decision maker wants to discriminate between
outcomes that are preferred to the status quo she can do this by getting recom-
mendations from someone who has a biased view (relative to her own preferences).
Her demand for information is not purely ordinal, i.e. knowing whether the out-
comes are preferred to a safe alternative; for optimal decision making she also
requires cardinal information, i.e. how much better is the outcome relative to
the safe outcome. To distinguish between outcomes the decision maker consults
contacts that are more picky than she is7. Such contacts are picky in a particular
way. In particular they dislike the outcome which is the least preferred among
outcomes that are preferred to the status quo. In this sense the bias between the
preferences of the decision maker and the contact is minimal.
The corollary shows that in a setting where only actions are observable DM
may want to consult a contact who is biased in a particular way relative to her
own preferences. Such an effect is only possible when arm b (the lower ranked of
7We emphasize pickiness here since, as argued above, we believe the insight of diametrically
opposed preferences is less robust
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the risky alternatives) is ex-ante more attractive than the safe alternative. The
distinction between the demand for ordinal and cardinal information on outcomes
would not appear if the bandit only had one risky arm. These insights clearly
generalize to any finite number of outcomes on the arms.
4.2.2 Learning about a non-favored Alternative
We now turn our attention to contacts that are different from the decision maker
in that their ex-ante ranking of the risky alternatives are different. In particular
DM herself ex-ante favors arm a but she only have contacts who favor arm b.
As was the case in the preceding section observation in the informational setting
where outcomes are observable proves ”too” informative to give interesting re-
sults in the context of the simplicity of the decision problem. In this section we
therefore restrict attention to the informational setting where only actions are
observable (IA). The goal of this section is to understand if there are situations
where the decision maker prefers to learn from contacts who are biased, and char-
acterize the nature of the bias. In order to keep notation at a minimum without
losing important insights we specialize the model somewhat.
We start out be treating the case where both Xa+ and X
b
+ are singleton. In
this case DM does not need to distinguish between preferred outcomes on b8. By
observing an aligned contact DM can become fully informed about the desirability
of arm b.
Proposition 3 (Aligned Contacts). Suppose (i) that actions are observable, (ii)
contacts are willing to experiment with arm b only, (iii) there is a unique preferred
outcome on a and b (Xa+ and X
b
+ are singleton for all players). DM finds it
optimal to observe an aligned contact.
We now turn to the case where Xb+ is not singleton, but for simplicity X
a
+
is. We show that DM may want to observe a biased contact. In particular the
relationship between when it is optimal to observe an aligned contact is non-
monotonic in the ex-ante attractiveness of the favored risky alternative.
Proposition 4. Suppose (i) that actions are observable, (ii) that DM can observe
experimentation with risky arm b, (iii) arm a has a unique preferred outcome (Xa+
8Moreover we do not have to treat the case where DM might consider going back to b after
having learned that a has an outcome that she likes somewhat, i.e. she gets utility uˆa.
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is singleton), whereas arm b has several preferred outcomes (Xb is not singleton).
For u¯b − uˆb > 0 sufficiently large, there exists scalars 0 < Λ < Λ¯ such that
1. If arm a is either ex-ante unattractive (Λa < Λ) or ex-ante attractive (Λa >
Λ¯) then DM observes an aligned contact. Otherwise she observes a biased
contact (Λ < Λa < Λ¯).
2. An optimal biased contact, is biased on DM’s lower ranked outcome (uˆb).
The intuition is relatively straightforward. When any “good” news on arm
b is enough to convince DM to try arm b then observing an aligned contact is
optimal. Likewise when even “good” news on arm b is not enough to convince
DM to try out arm b it is again optimal to consult an aligned contact. In the
second case there is an added benefit to consulting an aligned contact. Since no
“good” news on b is enough to convince DM to use arm b herself, the only way
such information will be valuable is if it turns out that arm a is “bad”. In this
case the information gathered from an aligned contact can be used in the second
period. In other words information has only a second order effect on payoffs,
since the information does not convince DM to switch from her ex-ante favored
action.
When DM prefers to consult biased contacts then information has a first order
effect on behavior. That is there is sufficiently “good” news about b that convinces
DM to try out arm b. A biased contact is used to discriminate between the truly
“good” news and plain “good” news (which an aligned contact cannot). This
comes at a cost. In particular the not so “good” news is bundled with the “bad”
news, and this discourages use of arm b. However if the utility difference between
the truly good news and the relatively good news is large then it pays to consult
a biased contact to be able to discriminate between outcomes. Discriminating
the truly “good” news from the “good” news, allows DM to pursue the relatively
attractive arm a rather than ending up with a “mediocre” outcome on b.
A more general insight follows about the desirability of observing a biased
contact. Information about a non-favored alternative can either confirm the ini-
tial pre-disposition against the alternative or reject it. Learning from a biased
contact tends to have a first-order effect on payoffs, because the revelation of
good outcomes are sufficient to convince the decision to switch her ordering of
the risky alternatives. In contrast aligned information tends to confirm the pre-
disposition and information only has a second-order effect on payoff, that is the
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information will only be used upon learning that alternative a was unattractive.
In other words aligned information tends not overturn the ex-ante ordering of al-
ternatives, but information is still useful in that it can be exploited if the decision
maker’s conviction turns out to be false.
4.2.3 When Do Opposites Attract?
Do opposites attract? Will the decision maker ever prefer to learn from a contact
with an ex-ante ordering of the risky alternatives different from hers? Is it ever
preferable to get information about alternatives you would not consider trying
out yourself, to getting more information about alternatives you deem to be more
enticing ex-ante?
To study this question in its purest form we abstract from the issue of whether
it is optimal to consult an aligned or biased contact, that is we specialize to the
case where Xa+ and X
b
+ are singleton. Furthermore, to ease notation we assume
that all outcomes on arm j, j = a, b that are not preferred to the safe outcome,
yields the same level of utility, uj < 0. Essentially we specialize to two outcomes
to drive home the point as cleanly as possible. The following result shows that
DM may prefer to learn about an alternative that is not favored ex-ante, rather
than her ex-ante favored alternative.
Proposition 5 (Opposite Attracts). Suppose (i) actions are observable, (ii) DM
can observe contacts who experiments with either arm a or b, (iii) Xa+ and X
b
+
are singleton. Given Λa > Λb, there exist u¯ > 0 and u < 0, such that DM prefers
to learn about arm b iff u¯b > u¯ > 0 and ub < u < 0.
Notice that in both cases the proof works by driving a wedge of sufficient
size between “good” outcomes and “bad” outcomes on arm b. Eventually the
outcome on b becomes sufficiently attractive that the observer prefers to learn
about arm b although arm b is not ex-ante the most attractive arm. The DM
piggybacks on her contact, which helps her avoid ”bad” outcomes, and identify
“good” outcomes.
The result can be interpreted as follows. For a fixed ex-ante ranking of alter-
natives, the more ”passionate” a DM reacts to outcomes ”good” and ”bad” on b
the more likely that she will want to consult a contact with experience of alter-
native b. This insight is related to the fact that a mean preserving spread (i.e.
more variance) makes an alternative more attractive ex-ante. Here we use this
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insight with a vengeance; we increase the spread while keeping the arm equally
attractive from the perspective of providing own experimentation, it becomes
more attractive from the perspective of learning through observation.
5 Related Literature
This paper is not the first to consider modeling learning as a bandit problem.
Rothschild (1974) studies the problem faced by a monopolist who is uncertain
about how demand is affected by price. He models the monopolists choice be-
tween setting different prices in order to learn about demand as a two-armed
bandit problem. Bolton and Harris (1999) and Cripps, Keller, and Rady (2002)
studies a social learning problem in the context of a two armed bandit problem
where several agents simultaneously choose between two actions. Payoff realiza-
tions are publically observable. This leads to the usual incentive problems and
under provision of the public good (here experimentation with a single risky al-
ternative). Our model contains no such free-riding problem, nor does our model
display the encouragement effect identified in Bolton and Harris. The encour-
agement effect is a dynamic effect: a higher rate of experimentation by a player
today, induces a higher rate of experimentation by others tomorrow. This effect
does not appear in our model for the following reasons. First, the player being
observed does not move again after the observing player has moved, she has no
incentives to induce more experimentation. Second, one unit of experimenta-
tion fully reveals the state, once this has happened the demand for information
on that arm drops to zero, so there is no mechanism through which the player
providing the experimentation can induce the other player to experiment more.
More generally there is a literature on social learning that studies how efficient
adoption depends on simple rule of thumbs (Ellison and Fudenberg 1993, Ellison
and Fudenberg 1995) and properties of the sampling rules that players use when
learning from others (Banerjee and Fudenberg 2004). In a network context Bala
and Goyal (1998) studies social learning where players learn from a only their
neighbours. Their focus is on the question of which networks structures facilitate
optimal adoption.
The subject of the paper is most closely related to the literature on coarsening
of information. Apart from information coarsening, our paper shares with this
literature the assumption that communication is non-strategic, that is the player
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providing advice reports truthfully her information, given the informational con-
straints imposed on her9. Calvert (1985) studies the problem of a decision maker
faced with a once-and-for-all choice between two alternatives A and B. Before
deciding the decision maker can consult on the alternatives. A consultation leads
to either a recommendation or a rejection of the alternative. Thus information is
coarse. Calvert shows that the decision maker may benefit from getting advice
from an advisor who is biased towards the alternative the decision maker is him-
self pre-disposed to. The reason is that evidence from such an advisor against the
alternative is strong evidence that alternative B is indeed the better choice. Suen
(2004) studies a related model, but his main errand is to study how in the pres-
ence of heterogeneous beliefs, the optimal demand for biased information among
agents, slows the process of convergence of beliefs. Meyer (1991) studies how a
principal should organize sequential promotion contests when she only receives
coarse information of the form: ”Employee A performed better than employee
B”. Meyer shows that quite generally it is optimal to bias subsequent contests
in favor of the current leader. Suppose the principal wants to promotes the most
able of two employees (A and B) whom she cannot distinguish between ex-ante.
Suppose A wins the first unbiased contest. The informational gain from organiz-
ing another unbiased contest is zero. Either A wins, or B wins. If A wins she
should promote A and if B wins she is indifferent between A and B, so she might
as well promote A. However organizing a biased contest in favor of A provides
information. If B wins this contest then the principal optimally promotes B since
she was able to win in a relative hostile environment.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied the problem of a decision maker who must make sequential
decisions, and can rely on prior ”advice” from a suitably chosen contact out of a
pool of contacts. Many economic applications fit such a basic scenario.
When the decision maker consults on an alternative that she is already pre-
disposed to, then she gives preferential attachment to people like that a similar
to herself. As the attractiveness of the second best alternative increases she
shifts preferential attachment towards a more ”picky” contact. This contact helps
9Suen (2004) argues that information coarsening can also be given a strategic foundation in
the vein of Crawford and Sobel (1982).
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her to distinguish between favorable outcomes. If the decision maker instead
must consult on a lower ranked alternative then the relation between optimal
contacts depends non-monotonically on the value of the best alternative. When
the best alternative is either of low or high value then it is optimal to consult
an aligned contact. When the best alternative is of medium value it becomes
attractive to consult a picky contact. For low values information of the best
alternative information has a first order impact on payoffs, whereas for high
values information has a second order impact. A picky contact helps the decision
maker to distinguish between when her pre-disposition was faulty and when it
was (partially) correct.
In a wider sense our study highlights the potential benefits of diverse encoun-
ters. In the language of Granovetter (1995 [1975]) diverse contacts can be thought
of as ”weak” ties because they are likely to give access to information which is not
normally present within the ”strong” tie network characterized by homophily.
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A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof.
⇐: Suppose that we are in informational setting IO. Given the prescribed be-
havior of cˆ, it follows that if the state is such that u(f(a, θ)) > u¯b > 0 then after
the first period of play DM1 knows that the ex-post optimal action is a. In words
the value of further information about the state is 0.
Suppose now that the state of arm a is such that u(f(a, θ)) < u¯b. In this
case with positive probability the ex-post optimal action is b. cˆ switches to arm
b exactly if this condition is met. Thus DM learns whether the ex-post optimal
action is b or s in period 2. In other words in this case DM has a positive valuation
for additional information about the state.
⇒: We now show that if either of the stated conditions fails then the pair (cˆ, I)
is not first best. Suppose first that the informational setting is IA, while we keep
behavior of cˆ fixed as is in the proposition. Suppose cˆ does not switch arm in
period 2. Then DM can deduce that the ex-post optimal action is a. However
suppose cˆ switches to b in period 2. Since the informational setting is IA DM
only knows that α ∈ {b, s}.
Finally, suppose we are in informational setting IO but cˆ’s switching behavior
does not follow the rule switch to b if: u(f(a, θ)) < u¯b. Suppose cˆ stays with a
for some θ such that u(f(a, θ)) < u¯b then with positive probability the ex-post
optimal action is on b but this is not revealed to DM.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. First consider the trivial case where DM is not willing to provide exper-
imentation with b herself, i.e. Λb < 0. In this case observing a contact who is
aligned reveals to DM when arm a is preferred to the safe arm, and when its
not with probability one. Since arms are independent such information does not
affect the index of arm b. If DM observes a contact who is not aligned then with
positive probability she will not know whether arm a or s is preferred.
Next, consider the case where Λb > 0. Note that if X
a
+ is singleton then it
necessarily follows that Λb < u¯a ≡ uˆa.
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To see this note that by assumption we have: Λa ≥ Λb. Wlog assume that
u(xa(1)) = u¯a. We have that: Λa < u¯a, since
Λa =
pa(1)2u¯a +
∑
θ/∈Θa+ p
a(θ)u(f(a, θ))
1 + pa(1)
the claim follows as
∑
θ/∈Θa+ p
a(θ)u(f(a, θ)) is strictly negative.
Therefore we need only consider the case where there are two outcomes on
arm a preferred to the safe outcome. Without loss of generality assume that
u¯a = u(f(a, 1)) > u(f(a, 2)) = uˆa.
If an aligned contact is observed and good news is received then this informa-
tion should be exploited immediately. This follows from the observation that:
Λa({1, 2}) =
pa(1)
pa(1)+pa(2)
2u¯a +
pa(2)
pa(1)+pa(2)
2uˆa
1 + 1
As a matter of fact: Λa({1}) > Λa({1, 2}) > Λa If an aligned contact is observed,
then states on arm a are partitioned: {{1, 2}, {3}}, leading to expected payoff:
(1− pa(3))
(
pa(1)
1− pa(3)2u¯a +
pa(2)
1− pa(3)2uˆa
)
+ pa(3)(1 +
∑
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ))Λb
Suppose now that DM chooses to observe a biased contact. There are two types
of biased contacts to consider: (i) a player who only likes xa(2) (or alternatively
likes both xa(1) and xa(3)), (ii) a player who only likes xa(1) (or alternatively
likes both xa(2) and xa(3)). In the former case states on arm a are partitioned:
{{1, 3}, {2}}, and expected payoff is:
V1 = p
a(2)max
2uˆa, (1 + ∑
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ))Λb + (1−
∑
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ))uˆa
+
(1− pa(2))max
(1 + ∑
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ))Λb, V˜a({1, 3})

In the latter case states on arm a are partitioned: {{2, 3}, {1}}. It then follows
that if ”good” news is received about a then DM should immediately exploit this
news. If ”mixed” news is received then DM either tries out b (and does not go
back to a in period 2, since the myopic expected payoff is negative), or tries a.
This gives expected payoff:
V2 = max
(1 + ∑
θ∈Θa+
pa(θ))Λa, p
a(1)2u¯a + (1− pa(1))(1 +
∑
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ))Λb

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Now compare the value of observing a biased contact with that of an aligned con-
tact. First observe that when Vj = (1 +
∑
θ∈Θa+ p
a(θ))Λa, j = 1, 2 then observing
an aligned contact is optimal. When this is not the case, there are many cases to
treat. When the contact is biased on outcome 1 the relevant case is where DM
changes her behavior after getting the information. Aligned contact is preferred
to a biased iff:
pa(1)(u¯a − (1 +
∑
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ)))Λb) > 0
and an aligned contact is preferred to a contact biased on outcome 2 iff:
pa(2)(uˆa − (1 +
∑
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ))Λb) > 0
Since uˆa < u¯a the statement follows.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. Suppose Λb ≥ 2uˆa1+P
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ)
then it follows from proposition 2 that it is
not optimal to observed an aligned contact. Note that since Λa > Λb it follows
that Λb < u¯a. We now determine which form the bias takes, in particular we
show that V1 > V2. Since Λb ≥ 2uˆa1+P
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ)
it follows that:
V1 = p
a(2)2u¯a + (1− pa(2))(1 +
∑
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ))Λb
and
V2 = max
pa(1)2uˆa + (1− pa(1))(1 + ∑
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ))Λb, (1 +
∑
θ∈Θa+
pa(θ))Λa

If V2 = 2Λa then the result is immediate. In the other case it follows that V1 > V2
since:
pa(2)(2u¯a − (1 +
∑
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ))Λb) > 0 > p
a(1)(2uˆa − (1 +
∑
θ∈Θb+
pb(θ))Λb)
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The proof proceeds by dividing into two cases: (i) Λa < 0 and (ii) Λa ≥ 0.
Consider first case (i). DM is restricted to learning about arm b, Λa < 0 and the
arms are independent. Thus DM never experiments with arm a. Consequently
it is optimal to be able to distinguish perfectly when arm b is preferred to the
safe action. This can only be achieved by observing an aligned contact. Next,
consider case (ii). Suppose wlog that when arm i, i = a, b is in state 1 then it
generates the outcome preferred to the safe outcome. We have either u¯b ≥ Λa or
u¯b < Λa. In the former case if an aligned contact is observed then the value is:
V align = 2pb(1)u¯b + (1− pb(1))(1 + pa(1))Λa
Suppose now that a biased contact is consulted. First some notation is needed.
Let V˜b(t,Θ
′) be the value of a two armed bandit, with arms b and s, conditional
on the information that state of arm b is in the set Θ′, and when the decision
horizon is t periods.
The value of consulting a biased contact, who dislikes outcome xb(j), j = 2, 3,
may be written:
V bias = pb(j)(1 + pa(1))Λa + (1− pb(j))max
(
V˜b(2, {1,−j}),
(1 + pa(1))Λa, (1 + p
a(1))Λa + (1− pa(1))V˜b(1, {1,−j})
)
The first case pertain to a situation where knowing that the ”good” state is
bundled with one ”bad” state is sufficient that DM now regards b the more
attractive choice (V˜b(2, {1,−j}) > (1 + pa(1))Λa > 0). The second case pertains
to a situation in which knowing that the ”good” state is bundled with one ”bad”
state is not enough to convince DM to try arm b instead she will try arm a,
and will not find it worthwhile to go back to b in period if a has a ”bad” state
((1 + pa(1))Λa > V˜b(2, {1,−j}), V˜b(1, {1,−j}) < 0). For the final case the last
inequality is reversed, so that if a ”fails” then it is worthwhile to return to b in
the second period.
For the first and second case simple algebra shows that it is optimal to consult
an aligned contact. Turning to the final case consulting an aligned contact is
optimal provided that:
u¯b > Λa +
1− pa(1)
(1 + pa(1))
pb(−j)
pb(1)
u(xb(−j))
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Since the last term of the RHS is negative this inequality is satisfied.
Now turn to the case where: u¯b < Λa. Observing an aligned contact yields:
V align = (1 + pa(1))Λa + p
b(1)(1− pa(1))u¯b
For the biased case the value depends upon whether the expected value of the
bundled states is greater than 0 or not.
V bias = (1 + pa(1))Λa + (1− pb(j))(1− pa(1))max
(
0, V˜b(1, {1,−j})
)
Clearly it is optimal to observe an aligned contact in this case.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Suppose DM consults a contact who experiments with b, and only actions
are observable. Recall that Λb < Λa. DM can either observe a contact with
aligned or biased preferences. Suppose that u(xb(1)) = u¯b > uˆb = u(xb(2)) > 0.
If a biased contact is observed then it is clearly favorable to observe a player with
preferences who is biased on the outcome corresponding to uˆb.
Suppose first that Λa ≤ 0. When observing an aligned contact the value is:
V align = (1− pb(3))V˜b(2, {1, 2})
Whereas if a biased contact is observed:
V bias = pb(1)2u¯b
Clearly in this case an aligned contact is optimal.
Assume now that Λa > 0. Consider the value of observing an aligned contact.
The value is composed of two elements. If DM learns that b holds an unattractive
outcome, then she plays the bandit as if alternative b did not exist. On the other
hand if she learns that b has a nice outcome (but not which), then she has two
options. She can either exploit that information now (and forego alternative a)
or she can try a and return to b if a does not give a nice outcome. Hence the
value of observing an aligned contact is:
V align = pb(3)(1 + pa(1))Λa+
(1− pb(3))max
(
V˜b(2, {1, 2}), (1 + pa(1))Λa + (1− pa(1))V˜b(1, {1, 2})
)
27
When Λa < V˜b(1, {1, 2}) then the first argument applies, and if Λa ≥ V˜b(1, {1, 2})
then the second argument applies.
If a biased contact is observed, then if DM learns that b does not hold the
most attractive outcome, she must choose a and will not return to b. If she learns
that b holds the most attractive outcome then she has two possibilities. Either
”postpone” using the information till after she learns whether a is better, or start
using the information immediately (ignoring alternative a). The value is:
V bias = pb(1)max (2u¯b, (1 + p
a(1))Λa + (1− pa(1))u¯b) + (1− pb(1))(1 + pa(1))Λa
Similar to the aligned case the first argument of the max applies when Λa < u¯b
and the other argument if Λa ≥ u¯b.
In the following table the interval where Λa < 0 is denoted by (I), the interval
0 < Λa < V˜b(1, {1, 2})1+pa2 is denoted by (II), the interval V˜b(1, {1, 2})1+p
a
2
< Λa <
1+pa(1)
2
u¯b is denoted by (III), and the interval where Λa >
1+pa(1)
2
u¯b is denoted by
(IV). Denote the value functions associated with observing an aligned contact
Interval Aligned Biased
I (1− pb(3))V˜b(2, {1, 2}) 2pb(1)u¯b
II pb(3)(1 + pa(1))Λa + (1− pb(3))V˜b(2, {1, 2}) (1− pb(1))(1 + pa(1))Λa + pb(1)2u¯b
III (1 + pa(1))Λa + (1− pa(1))(1− pb(3))V˜b(1, {1, 2}) (1− pb(1))(1 + pa(1))Λa + pb(1)2u¯b
IV (1 + pa(1))Λa + (1− pa(1))(1− pb(3))V˜b(1, {1, 2}) (1 + pa(1))Λa + (1− pa(1))pb(1)u¯b
and a biased contact V align and V bias respectively. Note that the value functions
are weakly increasing in Λa everywhere.
Simple algebra shows that in interval I V align > V bias. In interval II we have
V bias > V align if Λa > uˆb
2
1+pa(1)
. It is possible that u¯b /∈ II. The precise condition
that u¯b ∈ II is u¯b > uˆbpb(1) p
b(1)−pb(2)pa(1)
1+pa(1)
. Which is satisfied for u¯b − uˆb sufficiently
large. Intuitively this makes it more profitable to be able to distinguish the two
outcomes. It is always possible to construct such decision problems by adjusting
the utility values on b where u(xb) < 0 appropriately.
Turning now to interval III algebraic manipulations show that provided that
Λa < u¯b
1+pa(1)
2
− pb(2)
pb(1)
uˆb
2
then it is optimal to observe a biased contact. The
condition that the threshold belongs to interval III is: u¯b > uˆb(1 +
1−pb(3)
pb(1)(1+pa(1))
),
which holds provided u¯b− uˆb is sufficiently large. In interval IV we have that the
aligned contact is better than a biased contact.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Let µi ≡ V˜i(1, {1, 2, 3}), i = a, b denote the ex-ante unconditional ex-
pected payoff from pulling arm i once. Recall that by assumption: µi < 0. For
convenience assume that when an arm is in state 1 then the outcome is preferred
to the safe outcome. Let V i denote the value of observing experimentation with
arm i.
Consider first the case: 0 < Λa < Λb. In this case we have:
V a = pa(1)2u¯a
V b = pb(1)2u¯b
So the requirement that V a > V b becomes:
u¯b >
pa(1)
pb(1)
u¯a
In order to see that for given Λa and Λb the inequality can always be satisfied,
totally differentiate µb and Λb in order to obtain the rates of change needed to
maintain the terms constant:
µb :
dub
du¯b
=
−pb(1)
1− pb(1)
Λb :
dub
du¯b
=
−2pb(1)
1− pb(1)
where ub denotes the utility associated with outcomes xb(2) and xb(3).
Note that if we change ub and u¯b at a rate at least
−2pb(1)
1−pb(1) in absolute terms
then both µb and Λb do not increase.
Next, we treat the case: Λa > 0 > Λb. In this case if DM learns about a her
payoff is:
V a = pa(1)2u¯a
If she learns about arm b her payoff is:
V b = pb(1)max (2u¯b, (1 + p
a(1))Λa + (1− pa(1))u¯b) + (1− pb(1))(1 + pa(1))Λa
And so there are two subcases to consider depending on: Λa ≶ u¯b. Consider first
the case: Λa < u¯b. Algebraic manipulations yields the following inequality for
V b > V a:
u¯b > p
a(1)u¯a − 1− p
b(1)
pb(1)
1− pa(1)
2
ua
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As in the previous case we can adjust utilities over outcomes on b suitably, un-
til the inequality holds, while keeping conditions Λb < 0 and µb < 0 satisfied.
Turning now to the second sub-case: Λa ≥ u¯b, we get V b > V a, provided that:
u¯b > − ua
pb(1)
Again we can use the same procedure as above.
Finally we turn to the case Λa > Λb > 0. We have:
V a = pa(1)max((1 + pb(1))Λb + (1− pb(1))u¯a, 2u¯a) + (1− pa(1))(1 + pb(1))Λb
V b = pb(1)max((1 + pa(1))Λa + (1− pa(1))u¯b, 2u¯b) + (1− pb(1))(1 + pa(1))Λa
We show the case where: V a = pa(1)2u¯a + (1 − pa(1))(1 + pb(1))Λb and V b =
pb(1)2u¯b+(1− pb(1))(1+ pa(1))Λa, the remaining cases are completely analogous
and left out. The condition that V b > V a becomes:
u¯b > u¯a +
1− pa(1)
pa(1)
1− pb(1)
pb(1)
ub − ua
2
As in the previous case the idea is to show that we can always change utility
levels on arm b to satisfy the inequality. From above we have the separate rates
of change needed to keep µb and Λb constant. Hence if the rate of change is
exactly
dub
du¯b
= −2p
b(1)
1−pb(1) then Λb remains constant. But
−2pb(1)
1−pb(1) is twice the rate of
change required to keep µb constant so at this rate µb decreases. We continue
this until the inequality is satisfied.
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